The results 0/ a previous inquiJy suggest that three 
can be said to rejlect the various understandings that therapists heme about how to enact the prq/ession 's commitment to both competence and caring When therapists act as technicians or authoritarian parents, patients register their disappointment over a valucaion of competence that excludes caring actions.
In a more current inquily into the climate o/caring, patients and caregivers reflect about the current health care system and identify three societal constructs that shape a preference for competence over caring (a) emphasis on the rational jixing of the health care problem, (b) overreliance on methods and protocols, and (c) to give care, the beliefs about competence and caring found in the occupational therapy tradition have warranted consideration (PeloqUin, 1990) . Three images of how occupational therapists act in practice dominate patients' stories: the images of technician, parent, and collaborator or friend. When therapists act as technicians or authoritarian parents, patients cast them negatively in stories that reflect their disappointment. When acting in either of these manners, therapists seem to value the competence articulated within the professional literature more than they value the caring aspects ofrelationslJlp (Peloquin, 1990) . Both of these enactments, however, reflect some understanding of ',.vhat it means to care The technical therapist, equating expertise with care, values the best method and the successful outcome. The parental therapist manipulates the decisions and methods that are in the patient's best interests and sees this action as caring. In each of these images of carc, the therapist's competence dominates the encounter.
If choosing how to be among patients is a matter of some consideration, it follows that a number of societal beliefs and expectations also shape a therapist's choice. Those beliefs are the subject of this discussion. It seems apt for occupallonal therapists to consider the societal fmces that surround practice. A'i Yerxa (1980) said, "Occupational therapy, which began in a climate of caring, has been influenced in its practice by social change" (p. 532). It is a growing truism that the current health care system is now perceived as "not oriented to the human being"' (Baum, 1980, p 514) . What causes this disorientation to persons" King (1980) suggested that any sense of the meaning of caring is an intermingling of personal, professional, and societal beliefs. Any lack of caring that derives from a preferential valuation of competence must also reflect such an intermingling.
Nature and Scope of the Inquiry
This article constitutes part of a larger inquiry into the challenge of creating a climate of caring. Conducted between January 1990 and September 1991, the inquiry considered the follOWing: (a) persona] narratives that describe impersonal treatment; (b) the historical events and societal constl'ucts that have shaped the patient-helper relationship; (c) empathy and the manner in which helpers learn to be empathic; (d) the nature, practice, and experience of art; and (f) the proposition that empathy might be cultivated through the use of art Each step of the inqUiry required an extensive literature review from which important themes emerged These themes were then subjected [Q the refleClion, analysis, and symhesis characteristic of sWdies in the medical humanities.
A number of phenomenological narratives about the impersonal trc,\[mem of patients served as subjects for an earlier discussion (Peloquin, 1993) . That discussion produced a descriptive profile of those behaviors to which patients refer when they use the term depeJ"sonalizing The central complaint found within those narratives was that when rractitioners act impersonally their behaviors are discouraging. Patients say that helpers fail to see illness and disability as emotional events charged with personal meaning. They fail [Q attend to the experiences of patients; instead, they establish a distance that diminishes them. They withhold information, they use brusque manners, and they misuse their powers. They are insensitive, Silent, and aloof. Patients conclude that their helpers may treat them, but they do not treat them well.
Alongside these descriptive narratives were a number not included in the discussion on depersonalization because they were more reflective than descriptive: (a) those written by patients who consider the beliefs that may cause their helpers to behave carelessly; (b) those written by caregivers who, after their own bout with illness and impersonal treatment, discuss societal expectations; and (c) those written by helpers who ponder the difficulties of caring. These reflections offer cues about the societal constructs that may have a hand in shaping care, and, as cues, they constitute assumptions that can direct further research.
This discussion does not address concerns in practice such as those that Bailey (1990) described as the "harmful variables" that cause therapists to leave the field (p. 23). Staff shortages, large caseloads, red tape, excessive parerwork, lack of job status, chronic conditions of the patient population, lack of respect for occupational therapy by other professionals, stress and overload, and the need to justify treatment also shape decisions about the manner in which helpers will choose to care. Many of these negative variables, although not the specific focus of this inquiry, can also be said to associate with the societal beliefs that are the subject of this discussion.
The Connections That Mean Care
A number of stories do rortray helpers as caring persons who offer patients equal measures of competence and caring (Peloquin, 1989; Peloquin, 1990) . These stories suggest that caring attitudes, gestures, and words give patients the courage to face illness and disability.
Pekkancn (1988) treated a 14-year-old boy whose electrical accident had warranted amputation of his legs; Pekkanen willed himself to feel the boy's injury from the jnside out. He then understood: The directness and the proffered confidence held in these words meant concern to Benziger; she would call this therapistfriend. Sarason's (1985) point of view is no doubt the most helpful. At the vel)' least, he said, practitioners can try. Patients, he says, mostly ask helpers to try "in ways that say 'I am trying to understand because I \-vant to be helpful.' It is those manifestations that are experienced as caring and compaSSionate, even though they may be more or less ineffective" (p. 188). And when "a patient, whether terminal or not, draws courage-courage to live or courage to die -from the man who stands at his bedside" (Hodgins, 1964, p. 843) , surely they both feel the magic of care. If practitioners can be both competent and caring among their patients, what societal beliefs cause them to act otherwise? Three constructs surface within the reflections of patients and practitioners as shaping forces that compromise caring expressions: (a) an emphasis on the rational fixing of problems; (b) an overreliance on methods and protocols; and (c) a health care provision system that is driven by business, efficiency, and profit.
The Empha,is on Rational FiXing
One societal belief that compromises caring actions is the emphasis on solVing discrete health care problems in a logical and rational manner. When Hodgins wrote in 1964 after his stroke, he found a particular form of disregard at the heart of the problem. He described this picture of how the patient and the caregiver perceive illness: Many health care narratives hold similar pictures, with helpers governing some aspects of care while neglecting others that their patients value. Sir Dominic Corrigan, a physician, argued as long as a century ago that the trouble with doctors is "not that they don't know enough, but that they don't see enough" (Cited in Taylor, 1972, p. 6) . Van Eys (1988) , also a physician, has regretted the hemisected worldview in which "diseases become pmbJems, and patients become dissected into such problems" (p. 21). Patients resent this narrowness of focus because it feels uncaring. They complain that practitioners address their disease, the physiology and the mechanism of their bodies and dysfunctions, bur nOr rhe experience of illness and unease, not its meaning, and surely nor their feelings.
Disregard for pans of persons disturbs j\!lurphy (1987), an anthropologist who wrote of his own disabling illness: "The full subjective states of the parienr are of little concern in the medical model of disabilitv, which holds that the problem arises wholly from some atomic or physiological disorder and is correctible by standard modes of therapy-drugs, surgery, radiation, or whatever" (p. 88). Sacks (1983), a neurologist who experienced impersonal care, considered this splitting insane: thc madness of [he last thr'ce centurics, the madncss which so manv of us -as individuals -go rhrough, and bv which all of u, are tempted. It is the Ncwronian·Lackean-Cartcsi~n view-variouslv par'aphrased in mcdicine, biology, politicS, industrv, etc, -which reduces men to machincs, auromata, puppers, dalb, blank rabler,. formulae, ciphers, s)stems, and renexes. (I'. 205) Sanon (1988) remembered in her Journal that after a stroke she \vas made to feel like "so many pounds of meat, filled with potentially interesting mechanical parts and neurochemical combinations" (p. 106), Leder (1984) cll"gued while in medical school that a person is never so many pounds of meat, that the human bodv is "not a mere extrinsic n,achine but our liVing center''-(p, 34), ParadOXically, however, it seems that the body, so prized in this narrow view of illness, matters little on a day-to-day basis. Most persons, said Leder, ignore the hody until it malfunctions. Then when they arc ill, they beg some practitioner to fix the complex mechanism that has disrupted the flow of their personal lives, Anel the picture of health care practice that one then sees is "an ironic fulfillment of Cartesian dualism -a mind (namely, that of the doctor) runs a passive and extrinsic body (that of the patient)" (p. 35), The image offered by Jourard (1964) , a psychologist, illuminates this Otwellian disjunction:
Each pallellllies in his 0" n cubicle, and tllcr'c ;\rc art<tched to hlll1 all kinds of wires, connected to his brain, hi;, muscles, his viscera. Every time these wires, which mc acrualh-eleClmnic pick-ups, transmir signab to a compurer indicaring rhat the bladder' is 100 full, a bowel Sluffed, and patienl hungry or in pain, before you could blink an eve, the computer sends signals to different kinds of appararus which empty rhe bowel and bladder, All the smmach, scrarch the itch, ma,ssage the back and so on. We could even mount the bed on a slowly moving belt; the patient gets in at one end, and four or si.x days laler his bed reaches lhe exit and the patient is healed -we hope. (I', 138) If this reduction is a prevalent view, is it fair to expect practitioners to think divergently, to routinely see and treat a self embodied instead of a body' If the general population views the body as a mechanism controlled by higher functions, as something that one has instead of who one is, why the surprise that practitioners engage only their rational functions in practice? If imagining patient experiences, sensing patient needs, and expreSSing personal feelings seem actions incongruent with fixing, practitioners are quite reasonable in underusing these socalled lower functions What is the problem, then, with treating bodies when thej! need fixing?
Most narratives answer that "when a patient appears as a physiological mechanism, the doCtor may neglect personal communication in favor of the immediate scientific task at hand" (Leder, 1984, p. 36) , The preference for fixing makes it easier for a helper to neglect feelings, easier to justify being Silent, curt, or aloof. The resulting problem is impersonal care, Any caregiver can focus narrowly on fL-'(ing, Gebolys (1990) 
remembered this incident:
A male rher'apist camc in whistling and cheerfull)' serring up his equipment. He slLlck the breathing tube::: into my mouth and rold me lO "breathe" which I did while he walked al'Ound the room admiring m\' nOWClS. ga7ing out rhe wimJo\V and rcmarking whar a lovell' day it was (p, 13) Mattingly (1991) gave occupational thel'apists pause for reflecrion when she argued that "therapists can come to reduce their practice to a manipulation of the physical body, forgetting how much their intetventions are directed to a person's life" (p. 986), Parham (1987) argued that there are such situations in occupational therapy when rime, encrg", and monel' arc funncled 11110 treating one small ran or thc rota I problem, ~ pan rhar mal' be insignifical1l in comparison with complcxities that arc more difficult to understand but that have a profound impact on the life siwat ion of the pariel1l being served. (p. 556) Schultz and Schkade (1992) shared a similar concern: "The current demand for therapists to base occupational therapy on acquisition of functional skills, , . may actually limit the contribution uf occupational therapy and may denv patients the opportunity to make vital changes in their occupational adaptation process" (p, 918) Certainly a patient's poem, "Some Other Day" (McClay, 1977) , presents an occupational therapist hent on partial fiXing:
Prescr\'c me from the occupational rherapisr, God She mean.S well, hUI I'm [00 lJu:.,· to m~kc baskets. "Please, open ,'our e\'es," rhe therapist says: You don't \\'~1I11 to sJecp the dal' aW:l)'." She "'ams 10 know whal I used to do, The consequence of a strong commitment w rational fixing -of the disease, the body, or the dysfunction -is a disregard that feels careless. And although practitioners mean well, physician-educator Anthony Moore (1978) acknowledged the problem: "Professions tend w be right in what they affirm and wrong in what they ignore" (p, 3),
The Reliance on Method and Protocol
A second societal belief that compromises caring is an overreliance on the instruments of health care practice: the techniques, procedures, and modalities that solve the problem. When they are ill, patients seek concern in addition to solutions, They grieve that in health care practice they find something else, Hodgins (1964) regretted the find:
For the physician, of course, it must have been wonderful, indeed, when true specifics began to arrive on the scene to supplant beef, iron, and wine or syrup of hypophosphates.
. As so-called science more and more enters medicine, the heedless or routine ph\'sician will be accordingl\' tempted to withdraw hi~ humanity and wait for specifics. (p. 843)
Hodgins considered the specifics needed for cure and the humanity needed for care different but inseparable aspects of care Flagg (1923) , a physician who practiced at the turn of the century, agreed; he regretted "the unwise employment of laborawry methods to the exclusion of personal attention" (p, 5), When a drug or a procedure suffices, a practitioner may think less about the need w make meaningful connections with the patient. The problem becomes clear in Barbara Peabody's (1986) recollection of an incident that occurred during her son's hospitalization for acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS):
Peter woke at two A.M., just as the intern was about to give him an injection in his left thigh "What do you bave there'" Peter asked. "What do you care'" the intern snapped back. "I care velY much, and I hope that's nOt pentamidinc." "What if it is'" the intern asked insolently. "Because if it is, I'm not supposed to get it anymore," Petcr replied. "I think you beller check mv chan and you'll see that it was discontinued on Monday." "Oh, no, the orders are still on your chart." "I'm sure they're not," Peter insisted. "Go back and read them again, you'll sec that I'm right.·' The intern left the room and never' returned (p. 51)
Reiser (1980) told the following StOlY abollt helpers whose reliance on protocol precluded personal attention, A woman hospitalized with a diagnosis of acute granulocytic leukemia and severe anemia agreed to an aggressive course of chemotherapy that made her quite ill. She was discharged after remission, and when she was readmitted 4 months later she refused chemotherapy, The staff decided that if she continued to refuse this treatment, she would he discharged Against Medical Advice. She refused and was discharged. Reiser's perception was that she had "stepped out of the established 'system' and had to he punished for it" (p, 146). Sacks (1983) rejected the argument that helpers must use only treatments or protocols, When facing surgery, he wondered, What son of man would Swan be' 1knew he was a good surgl:on, but it was not the smgeon but the person that I would stand in relation to, or, rather, the man in whom, [ hoped, the surgeon and the persun would be wholly fused. (p. 92) Cassell (1985) , another physician, shared a similar belief "Doctors who lack developed personal powers are inadequately trained, .. , Doctors are themselves instruments of patient care" (p, 1), When they are effective, however, methods and protocols take the upper hand. Helpers side with what works, so that a challenge to the procedure also threatens them, Martha Lear (1980) remembered the upshot of such an identification when her husband Hal, a urologist, requested a milder painkiller: "The resident got angry. He said, 'There is a medication ordered for pain for you, If you want it, you can have it. If not, you'll get nothing,' And he walked out" (p, 41), But patients, wrote the physician Pellegrino (1979) , do nor want practitioners to fuse with their skills: "Physicians have a medical education, an M.D, degree, a set of skills, knowledge, prestige, titles. They possess many things by which they mistakenly identify themselves" (p, 228).
Helpers wrap themselves in their procedural authority, binding themselves so tightly in their concern for the right method, the latest technology, that it is no wonder that their actions then seem constricted. Helpers can never be seen as personal if they offer knowledge or skills instead of themselves, Murphy (1987) resented the trade: "What I needed was not a new instrument, but an oldfashioned clinician with plenty of intuition" (p. 14). Patients argue that their helpers routinely neglect their feelings, that they have bought the argument in favor of impersonality.
But whenever anyone mentions using either selves or intuitive traits therapeutically, practitioners stir uneasily. They have a problem with being intuitive or personal.
Some actually caB caring!eminine. Lear (1980) claimed that her husband felt care from women, distance from men: "They were with him constantly, those woman figures, They were gentle and good, . The male figures were with him for ten minutes a day. They were marginal figures, shadowy and cold. They touched him with instruments -stethoscopes, blood-pressure gadgets" (PI', 40-41). It seems that here too helpers try to split the inseparable; they say that men will offer cures and skills, women service and caring. But patients argue that this and all other separations are unthinkable; all helpers must care.
Hodgins (1964) argued that encounters felt as personal are often what patients need most: "[The patient] will draw courage as he perceives human understanding underlying the professional techniques of those into whose care he has been given. Human understanding, however, is not to be found in the rituals of anything called medical science" (p. 841). Unhappily, concern for more personal issues seems to matter little in this formulaic belief Correct procedures produce the superior results that serve the patient's best interests.
Occupational thel-apists are among those who must admit that techniques and protocols can preempt caring.
Yerxa (1980) argued that "technique, once employed in the service of human needs, is rapidly moving us toward a society of total technology in which our ways of thinking and being themselves become so technical that we lose sighr of orher ways of thinking and being" (p. '5:30). King (1980) concurred, claiming that "thcrapists have ignored their instinct for caring" (p 52'». Heller and Vogel (1986) described Heller"s experience with the tight formula in his occupational therapy treatment for Guillain-Ban·e syndrome:
A, soon as I could sand a block of wood (\\ Ith anced to rest IXJlh afl11". it was written, 'lftcr SCl'en repetition,). ~ change MIS made to a coarser gr~dc of sandpaper, increasing the amounr of forcc requiced. and it w,,, just as punishing for me lO hal'c to exccute them ~s it had hcen in the bcginning (pp. J66-6 7 )
Although Heller wanted to savor his gain and determine his next move in therapy, a protocol forbade his doing so. Parham (1987) discussed the case of Longmore, a former faculty member at the Universiry of Southern California Program in Disability and Socicty:
He ",ao ,ubjcucd [0 long hours of occupational thcr;IJw training for \elf-c~rc ,kill, although he had no 1l1tention of pel·forming these time-consuming tasks independent,," at home. He planned to hire an atlelldanr who would expedite the pwcess, freeing him to usc hiS time ;lmJ enngv [() pursuc 11101·C Stln1UI:ltlng and productive activitlcs (p. -;56) Neither Heller's nor Longmore·s treatments heeded Baum·s (1980) reminder that interventions notwithstancling, "we are nothing more than a bystander in the life of that individual until a relationship is formed" (p 514).
A Hea!tb Care System Driven b)' Business, Elficlenc)', and Profit
Francis Peabody (1930) , a physician, articulated the problem well when he argued that "hospitals, like other institutions, founded with the highest human ideals, are apt to deteriorate into dehumanized machines' (p. :33) Many narratives suggesr that this dehumanilation stems from a system of providing health care that builds on business, efficiency, and profit. A small incident at thc hairclresser"s has given me something to trv to underst~nd .. While Donna was securing my hair into curlers, an old ladl' who was waiting to be picked up came and stood beside us and talked cheerfullv about herself and her daughters and Donna responded. It was though I did not exist, was an ;;nimal being gwomecl (p. 255)
The number of patients who seek treatment can compromise caring expressions in hospitals. A:.; Sarason (1985) wrote, "The clinician becomes a rationer of rime, and that obviously sets drastic limits on the degree to which the ever-present client need for caring and compassion can be met"' (p 170) The result of that rationing is the feeling articulated by Peter Peabody during his visits to a busy clinic "I just feel like they don't give a damn.... I feel like I'm always bcing ignored, they don't care" (1986, p. 172) . Additional complications associate with the business of hospitals, however, by virtue of their lifesaving function Hodgins (1964) discussed the personal estrangement that occurs with the rapid interventions warranted by life-tht-eatening illness:
Spe~king a, a p~til'Ill, I think this point is important: that the stroke Victim is most likelv to encounrer. as his first mcJic~1 ministranr. 8 plwsiu~n to whom he IS a total stranger. Since >peedv hospitalization is usuallv a first goal in stt"Oke, lI·eatl1lent bv str~ngers h like" to continue. (p. K39) Peabody (1930) explained one consequence of the lifesaving business:
WIlen a patlelll cme,-S a hospital, the first thing th:1I mmmollly happens 10 him is th~t he loses his personal i(lentitl'. He is gencral"· rcferred 10, not as HenrI' Jones, but as ·'that case of mitral stenosis in the second bed 011 the Icfl'·.
. It leads, more or less dlreetl~·, to the patient being treated ;IS a casc of mill-al stenosis, and not a siek I11~n. (p. :31) The problem is a matter of focus; the institutional eye sees the rele\'ance of saving Henry's life and so does not capture the wider clinical picture-that although "Henry happens to have heart disease, he is not disturbed so much by dyspnea as he is by anxietv for the future" (Peabody, 1930, p. 34) .
The efficiency of the bea/tb care system Murphy (1987) has spoken to the kind of ordering that occurs in institutions, renaming the hospital an island invaded by a rationalized system of schedules and shifts: "The hospital has all the features of a bureaucracy, and, like bureaucracies everywhere, it both breeds and feeds on impersonality" (p 21).
The impersonalitv is well illustrated in Saxton's (1987) 
account
The scmie,t pan of the hospitali,atiol1 for me was not the surgery hut thc dml<x l"Ounds. On the mornings when thcse rituals werc scheduled, the nurscs :we! aides awakcncd us much earlic,-than usual. ,\>Icals and \\ ash-ups were rushed.
Then they would come, the sUl"gcons, the residel1ls. the imerns.
. Gebolys (1990) recalled that only on the founh day of her hospital stay did a nurse's aide wash her hair, which was bloody and diny from an automobile accident. The aide did so after her shift was over because the highly regulated day precluded this helping task Sacks (1983) concluded thar "the hospital, in shon, is a singular mixllIre, where freedom and bondage, warmth and coldness, human ,wd mechanical, life and death, are lockedlOgether in rerpelllal combat" (p, 24), The battle sometimes seems insane, Murphy (1987) explained, because like most bureaucracies, the hospital has llIrned "capricious, arbitrary, and irresponsible as Wonderland's Red Queen" (p, 44) One feels the capriciousness in Beisser's (1989) experience with hcanless caretakers:
In one: hospital, the first hour of the nurses' shift was spent in a dctailed discussion of who would take coffce brcaks whcn. The pro/it ofheaLth care provision. Hodgins (1964) thought that helpers produce mostly problems with the profit-driven business of health care:
We have heard much sen[imcn[allamentation over the disappear· anee of the old "family phvsician" -dear. lovablc old Dr. Peat· moss, who delivered all thc babics, saw them through diphthcria, whooping cough and scarlet fever, sat at the deathbcds of the elderly, and never sent anyone a bill. This last lovable quality is, I suppnsc, why he disarpeared, I felt no sense of rersonalloss al his passing becausc I never knew him, I should have likcd to The physicians in my lifc all had very efficient accouming svstems-if nOI actual departments (I' 840) Longcope (1962), a physician, had argued even earlier that a business orientation causes "the 'quantification, mechanization and standardization' which are said to characterize this country" (p, 547), Within a business orientation to health care, knowledge takes coin value, cure becomes a high-priced commodity, and ill persons are transformed into buyers, Success and solvency turn into treatment goals, productivity and efficiency into the means to achieve them, In this scheme, more accrues from procedures that cure than from manners that care
Rabin (1982), a physician with amyotrophic lateral sclero· sis, remembered that his physician gave him a pamphlet outlining the course ofa disease that he already knew too wel1. He regretted that this physician gave him no suggestions about "how to muster the emotional strength to cope with a progressive degenerative disease" (p. 307),
Practitioners face a major quandary when their patients' needs for time and compassion compcte \vith the institution's need to prosrer. When high regard falls to those who treat the most patients CJ[' accumulate the mOSt billable units of time, momcnts spent noticing, listening, or communicating are harder to JUStify. Sarason (1985) explained: "Whose agent I was became a pressing, daily, mCJra! pmblem. I know what it is to have divided loyalties, to want to give up the fight, to rationalize away the iI1ler- 
Occupational Therapists Within the System
According to Sacks (1983), occupational therapists are among those who struggle more successfully against the impersonality within the health care provision system: "There are, of course, gaps in this totalitarian structure, where real care and affection still maintain a foothold; many of the 'lower' staff nurses, aides, orderlies, physiotherapists, speech therapists, etc. give themselves unstinting!y, and with love, to their patients" (p, 24), But occupational therapists speak openly about the frustrations of clinical practice; as Howard (1991) wrote, "occupational therapy does not exist in a vacuum" (p, 878), Growing numbers of patients are a concern, Departments must handle more ratieI1ls with fewer staff members because "productiVity and efficiency are becoming high-rriority goab" Cr 878). Howard argued that technological approaches are thus "valued more than the holistic use of a variety of methods" (p, 880),
The climme in hospitals seems one of "cost containmcnt" rather than caring (Howard, 1991, r, 878) . Kari and Ivlichels (1991) wrote of their regr<:t that "daily life for those living within the institution can become com ranmentalized and focused on receiving services to alleviate dysfunction" (p, 721), Trahey (1991) saw thc combat (0 which Sacks (1983) referred as a "struggle to integrate quality care with a businesslike approach to fiscal soundness" Cp. 397). Burke and Cassidy (1991) The enormit}' of the challenge pressed GI-ady (1992) [0 ask a more fundamental question: "[s there still enjoyment in occupational therapy, or have we become so controlled with the realities of productivity, reimbursement, and modalities that we al-e failing to see the process as pan of the outcome'" (p. 1063) A number of therapists have spoken to the powers essential for the struggle. Knowledge is one:
All occupationallherapisls should have rhe knowledge, skills. and altitudes to position themselves to gain inOuence, !lower, and contml of the systems in which rhel' operate. To move upward in rhe powe,· hierMchy, we must h:we knowkdg<: (I.e., expeni,c). kno",ing (i.e., process skills). (Ompelc'Kie,. <lnd (redenl"Jis (Nielson. ] 991. p. 8')4) But that competence, wrote Dickerson (1990) , must be temrered by another concern: "Cne must also be exel'-cised so that therapists never sacrifice quality of care for increased profits" (p. 137).
The quality of care central to OCCUIXltional therapy has traditionally included the assumption that "if therapistS Me to create indiVidually designed, personally meaningful trearmenr programs, then they must spend considerable time and energy getting to know each patient as a person" (Burke & Cassidy. 1991, p. 173) . More and more, according to Burke and Cassidv, occupational tlwraphts "must use a technical, protocol-driven approach to U-eZltmem" (p. 174). "Like plwsicians," they wrote, "we have had to amend our traditional allegiance [0 the patient due to increased fiscal restraint, which requires that we now consider the economic reditics of the hospitals in which we work" (p. 174)
Conclusion
Caregivers such as Vanderwoude (1988) have paused after the course of their own illness to explain: "My lliness was beneficial in helping me to be more reflective, in teaching me an element of patience, and in heightening my understanding of the person facing possible terminal lliness" (p. 125). Sacks (1984) was similarlv convinced: "I saw that one must be a patient, and a patient among patients, that one must enter both the so!iwde and the community of patienthood. to have any idea of what 'being a patient' means" (p. 172) Although such an experience offers a profound form of knOWing, first-pnson narratives can aho inspire helpcl-s [() consider rhe mannel' in which they care
Occurational therapists who choose how they will be among their patients do so within a comext shaped by an intermingling of personal, professional, and societal beliefs. Occu pational therapists have traditionally endorsed a practice based on competence and caring (Peloquin, 1990) . Therapists who 'let as either technicians or authoritarian parents disappoinr patients with their overvaluation of competenCe. Several societal beliefs can be seen to connect with such overly competent enactments:
7he American joul71at of Occupaliuna! Tbemp.1' an emphasis on the rational fi.-xing of problems, an overreliance on method and protocol, and a health care system that thrives on business, efficiency, and profit.
A focus on fixing bodily parts and functional problems leads to a tendency to disregard a patient's understanding or feelings about illness. To a patient, the disregard feels technical rather than personal. A reliance on protocols that have success, authority, and reliability leads to a tendency to deny a patient's control, to dismiss a helper's intuition about what is right. To a patient, this preeminence of protocol feels impersonal and authoritarian. The routinization and rationalization of health care institutions lead to discourteous behaviors The actions feel efficient but uncaring. Therapists who act as technicians or authoritarian parents refleet society's rreference for the rational fLXing of problems, the imrlementing of successful strategies, and the management of solvent businesses. Ami although each of these orientations is important and worthy of affinl ,JLion in any health care practice, overvaluation of anyone of these can compronlise the anions and words that mean care. Practice that values the person must build on both competence and caring.
Toward the end of his personal litany of complaints, Hodgins (1964) remembered the need that helpers also have for cOLli'age in the face of illness. He ended his address to the Academy of Physicians by suggesting that practitioners consider a picture of practice that might replenish their commitmem: "Reclothe yourselves in humanity" (p. 843). It is hoped that occupational therapists will be among those who will hold fast to this image of pet'sonal caring as they practice competent care. A
